Analysis
Hannah Goodman died on 14 July 2020. She was survived by her late husband, Adrian, who himself died on 11 June 2022. The claimant was the Withers Trust Corporation, which was the executor appointed by Adrian’s last will, dated 2 November 2020.
The claimant sought an order pursuant to s2 of the Forfeiture Act 1982 that the application of the forfeiture rule to Adrian’s interest in Hannah’s estate and to his interest in jointly owned assets be modified, so as to give Adrian full relief from forfeiture.
In October 2017, Hannah was diagnosed with lung cancer. By April or May 2020, matters were terminal. Around that time, chemotherapy, which Hannah had previously been receiving, was stopped because it was no longer working. The medical notes for the rest of the summer months of 2020 indicate Hannah suffering from pain and various apparently unpleasant and uncomfortable side effects of her cancer and the treatment she was receiving.
Hannah is recorded as having commented to her GP in July 2020 ‘we’re in the end game, aren’t we?’ Later in the same month, a GP who made a home visit recorded that Hannah was struggling with pain and also with fear or terror, also noting that a plan had previously been made for Hannah to attend Dignitas (a Swiss facility which assists terminal patients to commit suicide), but that this had been rendered impossible by the Covid pandemic. The note records also that Hannah and Adrian were struggling as they could not ‘end it all’ as they wished.
On 14 July 2020, according to her death certificate, Hannah died at home, the cause of her death being given as lung cancer. Adrian reported the death by telephone, and recorded himself as having been present at the death.
In December 2020, Adrian composed a note to his solicitor to which a letter of wishes for his own estate was attached, but in which he addressed a number of matters. The covering letter provided on this occasion anticipated that Adrian’s body would be discovered in the garage in the garden of his home, apparently on the basis that Adrian intended to take his own life there.
Adrian’s note concluded by saying that ‘Adrian did what Hannah wanted, and what he was later to regret to the bottom of his heart, not only ending the life of another human being which was bad enough, but to have killed his best and only friend proved to be an action which he just could not bear. So putting Hannah’s and his affairs in as best a condition as he could, he took his final drive.’ On receipt of this note, Adrian’s solicitors contacted the police, who attended the property, finding Adrian unharmed physically but in a state of sadness.
On 11 June 2022, Adrian took his own life by carbon monoxide poisoning.
On the face of Hannah’s will, Adrian was the sole beneficiary of her estate. Her will also provided, however, that if that gift to him were to fail, a substitutionary gift to Hannah’s trustees would take effect, according to which they would hold the residue on a discretionary charitable trust, and subject to her directions as expressed in a letter of wishes dated 5 February 2016. That letter of wishes referred to Hannah’s wish to establish a foundation with charitable status so that IHT would not be paid on her estate, and also explained that her wish was to benefit those with an interest in the classic car industry with the aim of providing apprenticeships for 16- to 25-year-olds.
On 2 November 2020, Adrian had made his own last will appointing the claimant as his executor. By the terms of that will he left his residue to charity, and by reason of the definition section of that will, the charity was to be a charity qualifying as one exempt under s23 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984.
On 1 June 2022, Adrian signed a letter of wishes in which he explained that he hoped the charity beneficiary of his will should be the Armiger Foundation, if established in the future. In fact, it had already been established.
Whether or not the gift to Adrian was subject to forfeiture would make a substantial difference to the tax treatment of the gift in Hannah’s documentation. Hannah’s substitutional charitable gift, as worded, would not qualify for charitable exemption under the HMRC criterion, because it was not restricted geographically as required (in approximate terms, to the European economic area). On the other hand, were her estate to pass into Adrian’s estate, it would definitely attract the exemption under s23 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984. The difference in the amount of inheritance tax charged would be just over £200,000, plus interest and penalties.
Held:
Relief from forfeiture would be granted.
The court would have to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there had been an unlawful killing or assistance in a suicide, and that as such the provisions of the Forfeiture Act 1982 were engaged, and then go on to consider whether to grant relief with regards to the conduct of the offender, the conduct of the deceased, and such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material to determine whether the justice of the case required modification of the rule.
As to whether there had been an unlawful killing or assisted suicide, it was clear from Adrian’s note that he either assisted Hannah to commit suicide or ended her life himself, and so the act was engaged.
As to the conduct of the ‘offender,’ it was absolutely clear from the note and the eulogy that Adrian had caused Hannah’s death only with extreme reluctance, in an act of desperation and as a last resort to which he was driven by the absence of any other apparent unavailability to Hannah of any other source of help to end her life and her suffering. It was clear that it had caused Adrian unimaginable distress and that he had been unable to live with what he had done, and that he considered himself to have died of a broken heart as a direct result of his having done so. The court concluded that he acted solely with compassionate intent and as a last resort.
As to Hannah’s conduct, the medical notes demonstrated her own wish and intention to end her life, and that she had formed by 13 July 2020 a settled intention that that was what she wished to happen. Although it was impossible to say exactly what had happened, it was apparent that the ending of her life was at least consistent with her clear and settled intention.
As to the effect that an order granting relief would have, the primary effect would be simply that the charitable foundation, the Armiger Foundation, with purposes that were entirely consistent with the wishes as expressed by both Hannah and Adrian for their residuary estates, would receive approximately an additional £200,000 towards its objectives. As had been established in the case of Re Goodchild [1997], the fact that the tax saving may have been the motive for the application, which would not perhaps have needed to have been brought if Hannah’s will had been drafted in slightly different terms, was not relevant provided that the order would be properly made within the court’s jurisdiction. The fact that the tax-saving result would be achieved for the charity supported the conclusion that the justice of the case would require relief, provided that the other criteria were met.
Finally, as had been held in Dunbar v Plant [1998], Adrian’s moral culpability would be a factor of ‘paramount importance’. The Crown Prosecution Service guidance on the decision as to whether to prosecute in homicide cases would be of assistance in considering the question of culpability. That guidance set out a number of factors which, if present, would make prosecution unlikely. The first factor was whether the victim had reached a voluntary clear, settled and informed decision that they wished for their life to end. Here, the medical notes showed that Hannah did have such a settled wish. Second, the victim had the freedom and capacity to make such a decision. Third, the victim’s decision was made sufficiently close in time to their death, and have been independently reached, not influenced by pressure, control or coercion by the suspect or anyone else. The court concluded that Hannah retained capacity and that she had made the decision freely with full capacity, and certainly not under any coercion from Adrian.
Fourth, the suspect was motivated by compassion alone. Again, the court concluded that Adrian’s decision to act was motivated entirely by compassion, this being evident from the remorse he later expressed.
Fifth, the actions of the suspect were reluctant in the face of significant emotional pressure due to the victim’s wish for their life to end. Again, Adrian’s notes showed that he was driven to his action by desperation, and it was not something he did willingly, but did instead reluctantly because there was nothing else available to him.
Sixth, the suspect made a genuine attempt to take their own life at the same time. As to that, there is no evidence. There was evidence that Adrian did attempt to take his own life, and that he ultimately succeeded.
Finally, seventh, the suspect reported the death to the police and fully assisted them in their enquiries into the circumstances and their part in it. On this point the court found that Adrian did not, in fact, report the death to the police. What he did do was report the death promptly to the registrar and obtained the death certificate. The court commented that Adrian perhaps could be slightly criticised for not having taken the further step of going to the police.
Having regard to all of those factors, the court found that Adrian’s moral culpability was extremely low, and in particular was almost as low as any unlawful killer’s culpability could have been. It was plain that Adrian would not have been prosecuted, and that such prosecution would not have been warranted given his lack of culpability. There was, in those circumstances, nothing to warrant the court ascribing such moral culpability as would prevent the court from granting relief from forfeiture.
Taking all of the above matters into account, the court concluded that an order for relief would be necessary to do justice, and that the justice of the case required the grant of relief.
JUDGMENT MASTER MCQUAIL: [1] This is the disposal hearing of a Part 8 claim form which was issued on 23 June of this year. The Claimant is Withers Trust Corporation Limited being the Executor of the Estate of the late Adrian Berry. The main Defendant is the Estate of the late Hannah Goodman by an …Continue reading "Withers Trust Corporation Ltd v The Estate of Goodman [2024] WTLR 763"