Suggitt v Suggitt & anr [2012] EWCA Civ 1140

Analysis

Frank Edward Suggitt (Frank) died on 25 October 2009 leaving his entire estate (400 acres of farmland and several house) to his daughter Caroline. John, Frank’s son, was left nothing. Frank’s will, executed in 1997, expressed the wish (without creating a trust) that if at any time, in the opinion of Caroline, John showed himself capable of working and managing the farmland, that Caroline would transfer it to John.

The Suggitts had farmed in North Yorkshire for many generations. John was the youngest and only son. He had attended agricultural college at Frank’s expense, but left before finishing the course. Thereafter, Frank had provided John with 50 acres to farm and a place to live, but left in 2002 to live in York for nine months. John spent a £38,000 inheritance from a great aunt during his spell in York and then returned to the farm. In 2006, Frank provided John with 30 acres to set up in business breeding poultry and rabbits. At about this time, Frank’s solicitors wrote to ask him if he wished to change his will. Frank took no action.

HHJ Roger Kaye QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division) gave judgment on 20 April 2011. The judge was critical of John as a witness and found that he was not reliable. Nonetheless, the judge found that Frank had given John an unconditional promise that the farmland and somewhere to live would be his one day. The promise was made notwithstanding that Frank did not consider John fit to run the farm.

Caroline appealed to the Court of Appeal. No issue was taken with HHJ Kaye QC’s approach to the law or the finding that there had been a promise or assurance. Caroline argued that there was insufficient evidence of reliance and there could be no reliance where a claimant pointed to something he would have done anyway. It was not reasonable for John to rely on the promise he would receive the farm when he had incurred so little by way of detriment. Any change of position had to be significant. It had not been unconscionable for Frank to leave the farm on the terms he left it. The relief granted had been disproportionate and had been far more than the minimum necessary to satisfy the equity. There should be some proportionality between the detriment and the relief awarded.

Held (dismissing the appeal):

1. (1) The requirements for proprietary estoppel are well known: there must be an assurance, reliance, detriment and the relief granted by the court must be the minimum necessary to satisfy the equity (para [19]).
2. (2) The requirements for proprietary estoppel are not watertight compartments. Where there is doubt whether assurances have been given, the court may wish to look for confirmation in the evidence about reliance and detriment. That does not apply here where there is no challenge to the judge’s finding that there were assurances (para [30]).
3. (3) Reliance and detriment are clearly connected matters. Reliance is what a person does on the faith of some matter and detriment is usually the result. The same factual matters may show reliance and detriment (para [35]). There were substantial benefits to John in living at the farm and there was a limited amount of work (para [36]). However, it was for the judge to determine as a matter of fact and evaluation having heard the evidence if there was sufficient detriment and reliance. The judge had been entitled to hold that there was sufficient reliance and detriment (paras [37]-[40]).
4. (4) The fact that, in the absence of the assurances, Frank might properly have decided without acting unconsionably to deal with the farm as he had done in his will does not ask the right question. Unconscionability, in this context, is unconscionable conduct in failing to give effect to the assurances (para [41]).
5. (5) As to proportionality, there does not have to be a relationship of proportionality between the level of detriment and the relief awarded. Where the expectation is extravagant or out of all proportion to the detrimenet suffered, the court should satisfy the claimant’s equity in another more limited way. The question is whether the relief granted is out of all proportion to the detriment. Again, this is a matter of evaluation and judgment for the judge. Unless it was clearly wrong, the judge’s decision could not be disturbed. It cannot be said that the judge’s decision was perverse (paras [42]-[50]).

JUDGMENT LADY JUSTICE ARDEN: [1] At the date of his death on 25 October 2009, Frank Edward Suggitt, whom I shall call Frank, owned some 400 acres of farmland in North Yorkshire and in addition, on or adjacent to that land, a number of houses called Wellfield, then occupied by his son John and his …

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