Dawson-Damer & ors v Taylor Wessing LLP & anr [2018] WTLR 57

Spring 2018 #171

The appellants were beneficiaries of a number of Bahamian trusts; the respondent solicitors (‘TW’) act on behalf of the trustee of these trusts. On 4 August 2014, the appellants served a subject access request (‘SAR’) on TW, requesting disclosure of the personal data relating to the appellants held by TW as the solicitors for the trustee. The appellants were not satisfied by TW’s response to the SAR. They therefore applied to the court to exercise its discretion under s.7(9) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (‘DPA’), and grant a declaration that TW had not complied with the SAR, and an ord...

English & ors v Keats & ors [2018] WTLR 91

Spring 2018 #171

Deeds of appointment were signed by trustees in respect of three discretionary settlements on 8 March 1999 purporting to appoint interests in possession on the three children of the settlor. There were four trustees of each settlement. However,  only three of the four trustees signed the deeds of appointment, rendering those appointments ineffective. This error was not discovered until after the death of the trustee, June Thunder (June), who had not signed the settlements.

The claimants were beneficiaries to whom interests in possession were purportedly appointed under the defecti...

ET v JP & ors [2018] WTLR 109

Spring 2018 #171

The adult beneficiaries of a trust had consented to a proposed variation of the trust. Since the variation affected the position of beneficiaries who were minors and unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, the approval of the court under s1 of the Variation of Trusts Act was required. One of the minor beneficiaries (X) was severely autistic and lacked capacity to consent.

Section 1(1)(a) of the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 provides that the court may approve an arrangement on behalf of any person who by reason of infancy or other incapacity is incapable of assenting. Section 1(3) ...

Harris v HMRC [2018] WTLR 119

Spring 2018 #171

HMRC successfully applied to strike out Mr Harris’ appeal against an inheritance tax determination, under Rule 8 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009.
 Mr Hughes was appointed as Administrator of the deceased’s estate in June 2013. HMRC opened an enquiry into the IHT400 he filed, and determined that the IHT payable was £341,278.76. Mr Harris requested a statutory review of this determination; this upheld the determination. Mr Harris appealed against the findings of this review, though he did not challenge the quantum of the determination.


The b...

KA v MA
 [2018] WTLR 125

Spring 2018 #171

When the parties met in July 2000, they had both been previously married. In the husband’s case, a difficult divorce caused him to set his face against remarriage. He had three sons who spent significant periods of time with their father in a substantial property near Reading (Property G) which had a value of £3.35m. He (together with his brother) had a successful business in international travel and tourism, owning 51% of the shares in the company valued at £30m. The wife, who had no children, had two rented properties with a combined equity of £245,615. By the time she moved into Prope...

Keeling v Keeling & anr [2018] WTLR 173

Spring 2018 #171

Ellen Exler died intestate at the age of 91 on 12 November 2012 (the Deceased). Her residuary estate passed on her intestacy to her surviving brothers, Stephen Keeling (Stephen), Frank Keeling (Frank), and to the children of her late sister, Lilian Walker, in equal 1/3 shares. Virtually the whole value of the estate was represented by the Deceased’s home, Hadley House. A grant of letters of administration was issued to Stephen alone on 22 March 2013. On 27 March 2013 Owen Kenny, solicitors instructed to act in the administration of the estate, wrote to the beneficiaries, other than Steph...

Lee & anr v Lee & anr [2018] WTLR 197

Spring 2018 #171

Facts

In October 2002 the testator (T) and the first claimant (C1) bought Little Hendra Farm, Looe, Cornwall (the farm). They purchased as joint tenants. The farm consisted of a bungalow and some fields, within three registered titles. Title X included Village Field and Title Y included the Bungalow and Borehole and Church Fields. In fact, Title Z was the subject of a conveyancing mix-up, which was discovered later and resolved in 2008 by a transfer of the title, using form TR1, to T and C1 expressly as ‘joint tenants’.

In 2007, T and C1 made wills in substantially similar ...

Lewis & ors v Tamplin & ors [2018] WTLR 215

Spring 2018 #171

The claimants/applicants brought a part 8 claim, as beneficiaries of a trust of land in Glamorgan known as the Tamplin trust, for disclosure of documents and information by the defendant/respondent trustees. This claim was founded on the basis that the trustees owe a duty to account to the beneficiaries for their stewardship of the trust assets. They also made an application for pre-action disclosure; the court gave judgment on both matters.

The defendants opposed both the claim and the application on a number of grounds. Firstly, the beneficiaries had already received sufficient ...

Macmillan Cancer Support v Hayes & anr [2018] WTLR 243

Spring 2018 #171

Peter Thomson and his wife, Sheila Mary Thomson, were a loving and devoted lifelong married couple who had no children. He was 84 and had recently been diagnosed with prostrate cancer and had a grossly enlarged aorta which could rupture at any time. She was aged 88 and, due to the severity of her dementia, had been consigned to live in a care home. They had both made similarly worded wills in favour of each other and, on the death of the survivor, for the benefit of charities and friends. According to the findings of fact made by the coroner, on 18 April 2015 Peter collected Sheila from ...

Nield-Moir v Freeman [2018] WTLR 255

Spring 2018 #171

The deceased died intestate. The claimant (N) and the defendant (F) were both born to the deceased’s late wife (W) during her marriage to the deceased, such that a rebuttable presumption that they were both children of the deceased arose. Letters of administration were granted to F. F later sold the deceased’s house to herself.


N denied that F was the child of the deceased. N therefore sought revocation of the grant to F, as well as a grant to herself, a declaration as to her beneficial entitlement to the whole of the estate, and an order setting aside the sale of the house.