Analysis
This was an appeal against a decision of the County Court ([2016] WTLR 1075) to make reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 for Mrs Joy Williams from the estate of her deceased partner Norman Martin. Under the terms of Mr Martin’s last will his entire estate passed to Mrs Maureen Martin, Mr Martin’s wife, from whom he was separated, but to whom he remained married until the date of his death. Mr and Mrs Martin had not divorced but they had made an informal arrangement regarding their separation.
HHJ Gerald made an order that Mrs Williams should receive the entirety of the property in which she and Mr Martin cohabited (‘Coburg Road’) absolutely. She already owned 50% Coburg Road as beneficial tenants in common, and Mr Martin’s 50% share passed into his free estate, and therefore to Mrs Martin under the terms of the will.
Mrs Martin appealed against that decision, on the grounds that (1) the judge had been wrong to find that Mrs Williams established standing as a cohabitee or as someone being maintained by the deceased (‘standing’); (2) that the judge had been wrong to find that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for Mrs Williams (‘threshold’); and that the judge had been wrong to make the order for provision that he did (‘provision’). Permission to appeal was granted on threshold and provision but not on the issue of standing.
Part of the criticism of the judge’s reasoning was that he had left out of account Mrs William’s interest in a property known as ‘Slade Road’ as part of her financial resources, while also discounting Mrs Martin’s unchallenged evidence as to her own financial needs without a good reason for doing so.
Slade Road was a mortgage free property in which Mrs Williams had a 50% interest worth £135,000 at the date of trial. She had inherited this property from her father in 2008. Her sister was residing in the property rent-free free. Mrs Williams did not wish to evict her. The judge had left the property out of account when considering Mrs William’s financials resources.
Held (allowing the appeal in part):
1) There were grounds for the judge to reach the conclusions that he did about Mrs Williams financial needs in relation to income, so these grounds of appeal were rejected.
2) The judge’s decision to leave Slade Road out of account was perverse. While theoretically it was open to the judge to leave even a significant asset out of account, in this case there were not sufficient grounds to enable him to leave such a significant asset out of account. This ground of appeal succeeded.
3) The judge had been wrong to discount Mrs Martin’s evidence as to her financial needs which had not been challenged in cross-examination. In the absence of cross-examination and probing by the judge, the criticisms made by the judge of Mrs Martin’s evidence were unprincipled and wrong. This ground of appeal also succeeded.
4) The judge’s binary value judgment on the question of whether the will made reasonable financial provision should stand. Mr Martin and Mrs Williams lived as man and wife with a loving relationship in the same household over a considerable period of time. Mr Martin contributed to the household. Mr Martin and Mrs Martin’s relationship was over in all but law, and they had made a ‘do-it-yourself divorce’ arrangement. The provision under the will (ie nothing) was not reasonable provision for Ms Williams.
5) The award the judge had made could not stand in light of the grounds of appeal that had succeeded. A retrial would be disproportionately expensive, and it was appropriate for the appeal court to re-exercise the court’s discretion anew on the basis of the available evidence. Reasonable financial provision involved ensuring a roof over her head. She should be able to live in her family home rent free. The appropriate award was that Mrs Williams should be given a secure life interest in 50% of Coburg Road rather than an outright interest.
JUDGMENT SMITH J A. INTRODUCTION (1) The 1975 Act [1] The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the ‘1975 Act‘) as in force at the material time provides (so far as material): ‘1. Application for financial provision from deceased’s estate (1) Where after the commencement of this Act a person dies domiciled in …Continue reading "Martin v Williams [2017] WTLR 1041"