Analysis
The testatrix died on 19 February 2021. She left a will dated 14 February 2021 leaving all of her property (other than a small bequest to a charity) to the defendants (her sons). The claimant brought a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (IPFDA).
The claimant and the testatrix had begun spending time together in 2014. In 2018, the claimant proposed marriage and the testatrix accepted (though they did not marry and the defendants said that the testatrix had said that she did not really intend to marry the claimant). From September 2018 (when the testatrix was beginning chemotherapy), the claimant started to spend more time at the testatrix’s home.
The court found that, by February 2019, the claimant was staying with the testatrix four nights a week, and full time from May 2019 (giving up a job and beginning to work parttime near the testatrix and paying her £200 pcm which was the same sum previously paid by her sons for bed and board). As the testatrix’s condition deteriorated through 2019, the claimant became her primary carer.
The claimant said that in the year or so before she died, the testatrix had said that the claimant should have some money from her in recognition of his care for her, but that he had initially refused. However he said that, on 10 February 2021, the testatrix had insisted that the claimant should have £25,000, and said that he should look after the rest of the money in her bank account until her son (the first defendant) could ‘take over’, in order to prevent the money being ‘frozen’ by the bank after her death. The claimant said that accordingly, between 14 February 2021 and 20 February 2021, he had transferred £48,101.70 from the testatrix’s accounts using one of her cards.
The claimant argued that he had standing to bring his claim either because he and the testatrix had been living together in the same household as if they were husband and wife for two years before her death, or alternatively because he had been maintained by the testatrix. The claimant had only moved in fulltime with the testatrix in June 2019, so the standing questions focused on whether he and the testatrix had been living together in the same household between February and June 2019, and whether he had been maintained by her (or whether they simply had an arrangement whereby he was paying £200 board and also provided the testatrix with care as a quid pro quo).
The defendants brought a counterclaim alleging that the claimant had effectively stolen money from the testatrix while she was on her deathbed.
At the start of trial, it was agreed that the court would give judgment dealing with findings of fact, the counterclaim and the standing question, with further submissions to follow if the claimant was found to have standing.
Held (dismissing the counterclaim and determining that the claimant had standing to pursue the IPFDA claim):
The defendants’ counterclaim: did the testatrix authorise the payments to the claimant?
Notwithstanding that the defendants’ counterclaim required them to prove their allegation of theft, the burden should be on the claimant to show that the testatrix authorised him to make the bank transfers, as the issue was closely linked to the standing question and because a decision in the claimant’s favour would reduce the likelihood of the police prosecuting him. The standard of proof was the balance of probabilities.
The claimant’s account about the payments had been consistent, was corroborated by contemporary documents and reliable witness evidence, was inherently plausible, and could not be contradicted by the defendants’ evidence. While he had later lied about another matter (his intention to return all of the money), it was inherently plausible that this was because he wanted to avoid returning money which the testatrix had wanted him to keep.
The defendants had also argued in the alternative that by the time of the transfers, the testatrix had not been capable of consenting to them. However the court accepted that a friend had suggested to the testatrix that she transfer funds to avoid the account being frozen after her death, and that the testatrix had said this to the claimant on 10 February 2021 (when the medical notes indicated that the testatrix was alert and able to have a long conversation).
Standing: was the testatrix maintaining the claimant?
The claimant was being maintained by the testatrix for three reasons. First, the testatrix was making a substantial contribution in money’s worth to the claimant’s reasonable needs by providing him with accommodation (Churchill v Roach [2003] followed). The payment of £200 pcm was not full valuable consideration for this purpose, the sum being much less than what the claimant was paying for his flat and the same as the sum paid by the testatrix’s sons.
Secondly, taking into account the contributions to the household by both the testatrix and the claimant, on balance, the testatrix was maintaining the claimant (Jelley v Iliffe [1981] applied). The claimant was paying no more than what the testatrix’s children had paid, and what he was really providing was love, care and support which was not part of a quid pro quo.
Thirdly, even if the case fell to be treated as a proxy for a commercial relationship, the claimant was getting ‘the better’ of the deal.
Standing: were the testatrix and the claimant living in the same household as if they were a married couple for two years prior to the testatrix’s death?
On quantity of time, while the claimant did not live fulltime with the testatrix until May 2019, by February 2019 he was broadly living with her four nights a week. In terms of quality of time, they were engaged to be married, the claimant was supporting the testatrix through the deterioration in her health, and they were, from March 2019, thinking about the claimant moving in fulltime. Looking at the whole compass of the relationship, they crossed the ‘tipping point’ of living in the same household by February 2019 (Gully v Dix [2004] applied, Churchill v Roach [2003] distinguished).
JUDGMENT HHJ TINDAL: Introduction [1] We are all here because three years ago on Monday this week – on 19th February 2021 – Julie Adams – Julie as I shall call her – died tragically early at the age of only 54 from a cancer which she had been fighting for almost three years and …Continue reading "Kettridge v Adams & ors [2024] WTLR 979"