Analysis
Lisa Jane Clay (the deceased) and the claimant lived together from about 2003. They had a child together named Joseph, who was six years old in April 2013. From January 2013, they lived at the property at 36 Lowlands Road, Lancashire (the property) which the claimant and the deceased held as joint tenants. The deceased made a will on 18 August 2008 under which the claimant was the sole residuary beneficiary. The net value of the estate was £79,098.87 of which £60,000 comprised the deceased’s interest in the property. The couple’s relationship was at all times entirely stable, loving and had been long lasting.
On 8 April 2013, the claimant had been referred for a mental health assessment following attendance upon his GP with complaints of paranoia and hearing voices. The following day, he fatally stabbed the deceased and Joseph in the early hours of the morning. He was subsequently arrested and charged with murder. On 20 September 2013, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. That plea was accepted by the Crown. He was made the subject of a hospital order under s37 of the Mental Health Act 1983, and was detained accordingly.
On 16 December 2013, the claimant commenced civil proceedings, seeking an order that the Forfeiture Rule (the rule) as set out in the Forfeiture Act 1982 (the Act) did not apply in the circumstances of the case, or alternatively that the rule should be disapplied pursuant to s2(2) of the Act. First, he contended that the rule was of no application to some cases of manslaughter and second, that it ought not to apply in this case given the medical evidence concerning the mental health of the claimant when he unlawfully killed his partner and son.
Held:
- 1) The effect of the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal in Dunbar v Plant [1997] EWCA Civ 2167 and the authorities that followed that decision rendered the first argument entirely unarguable. The rule applied to all cases of unlawful killing, including manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility.
- 2) While the level of culpability was reduced by the impact of the mental disorder from which the claimant was suffering on 9 April 2013, it was not eliminated or reduced to the level where it could properly be said to be so low that to give effect to the rule would be contrary to the public interest.
- 3) The evidence did not establish that the abnormality from which the claimant was suffering caused the claimant to kill the deceased or his son. It established that the claimant acted in accordance with a decision to kill his partner and son, that he was aware of the nature and quality of his acts, that he was aware what he was doing was wrong, and he had significant control over his actions.
- 4) The nature and gravity of the offence committed by the claimant were factors that weighed against the disapplication of the rule. The relevant factors included the number of wounds inflicted by the claimant, the number of non-fatal wounds inflicted by the claimant prior to death, and the number of times he returned to attack each victim. As to the conduct of the claimant, there was nothing in the evidence which could rationally explain his actions.
- 5) Also important was the source of the deceased’s estate. Most of her interest in the property had been funded by what the deceased had been given by her late mother, which had been inherited by her late husband. The claimant had his own half share of the property and a half share of the sums credited to the joint account at the date of the deceased’s death.
- 6) Those who would benefit in the event that the rule was applied were largely aunts and cousins of the deceased who she did not intend to benefit. This was a factor which weighed in the balance against applying the rule, but not heavily – the will was not prepared on the basis that the deceased would be unlawfully killed by the claimant and it did not outweigh the other factors tending to the opposite conclusion.
Continue reading "Chadwick v Collinson & ors [2014] EWHC 3055 (Ch)"