Analysis
Celine Cawley, the deceased (D) and the defendant, her husband (H), owned real and personal property as joint tenants. D’s will left all her property to H and if he were to predecease her, to trustees for her children. She had one daughter. H was convicted of D’s manslaughter. Following his conviction, H expressly renounced his right to probate of D’s will. On 24 March 2010 letters of administration were granted to the plaintiffs (P), the personal representatives named in D’s will should H predecease her. By s120 of the Succession Act 1965 (the Act) a person convicted of the unlawful killing of another is prevented from taking any share in the will of the other, subject to exceptions not relevant to this case, and, for the purposes of the administration of any will of the deceased, is to be treated as having predeceased the deceased. However, the Act does not deal with the position of joint tenants and the right of survivorship. P applied to the court for guidance and sought relief and orders as appropriate. The questions to be determined were formulated by the court as follows:
- ‘(a) whether, as contended on behalf of the plaintiffs, the entirety of the joint assets form part of the estate of the deceased and the defendant has no interest in, or entitlement to, them or any part thereof; or
- (b) whether
- (i) severance occurred on the death of the deceased, so that the estate of the deceased and the defendant are equally entitled to the joint assets, or,
- (ii) alternatively, the joint assets have accrued to the defendant solely but, as to a moiety thereof, are held by him on a constructive trust for the estate of the deceased.’
Held:
- (1) The entirety of the joint assets did not form part of D’s estate to the exclusion of P.
- (2) While severance did not occur on the death of D, the joint assets accrued to H solely but as to one half share thereof they were held by him on a constructive trust for D’s estate [9.6].
The matter was to be determined according to the law at the time of D’s death and in the light of the parties’ rights as they stood at that time [9.1].
On the death of D the legal estate in the properties accrued to H solely by right of survivorship. In particular, having regard to the relevant common law principles it was not possible to conclude that the legal estate in the joint tenancy was automatically severed on the death of D and the crucial questions that had to be determined were whether, on the death of D, the legal title to the properties became impressed with a constructive trust and, if it did, what were the terms of the trust. H had conceded at the hearing that on D’s death he did not become solely beneficially entitled to the joint assets. Rather he acknowledged that the joint assets were beneficially owned in equal shares by himself and D’s estate and that the law, as a matter of public policy, would not permit him to obtain a benefit or enforce a right resulting from the crime he had committed against the deceased. However, any joint tenancy involved a chance and the chance was an ‘all or nothing chance’. It followed that at the material time immediately before D’s death there were a number of possibilities as to the ultimate destination of the joint assets, which would have turned on a number of imponderables, for example whether one or other of the joint tenants would sever the joint tenancy and which of the joint tenants would die first. It was not possible to form a view as to where the ownership of those properties would have ultimately vested, if these tragic events had not occurred. Accordingly, if the court were to hold that on the date of D’s death the joint assets accrued to H solely and were held by him on a constructive trust for himself and D’s estate in equal shares, that outcome could not be regarded as conferring a benefit on H as a result of the crime he committed. On the other hand, if the court were to hold that H on that day held, and continued to hold, the entire interest in the joint assets on trust for the estate of the deceased solely, it would effectively be interfering with H’s existing rights in the joint assets. In the absence of legislation empowering the court to so interfere with H’s existing rights at the date of D’s death the court had no power or jurisdiction to do so. Section 120 of the Act dealt with the distribution of property owned by the deceased person, not with the distribution of property in which an unworthy potential successor had rights so that it would be improper to determine, by analogy to s120(5), that the ownership of the joint assets following the death of the deceased should be determined on the basis that H should be deemed to have pre-deceased D [9.5].
JUDGMENT LAFFOY J: Factual background [1] Celine Cawley (the deceased) died on 15 December 2008. She was survived by her husband, the defendant, and her daughter, the third plaintiff (the beneficiary), who was her only issue. When these proceedings were initiated by special summons which issued on 15 June 2010, the beneficiary was a minor, …Continue reading "Cawley & anr v Lillis [2011] IEHC 515"