Analysis
The deceased, Mr Seals, (D) committed suicide on 10 December 2013. He was depressed following his wife’s death from cancer in August 2010. However, the mental health team who saw him in September and November 2012 did not identify any major disordering mental illness. After his wife’s death D renewed a childhood friendship with the applicant Mrs Williams (B) and letters he wrote to her suggested a considerable degree of emotional dependence upon her. On 12 May 2011 he made a will using B’s solicitors and appointed her his executrix. He left her all his property and assets. At the same time he wrote a letter of wishes explaining that he had made no provision for his children since they had not been in contact with him since his wife died and he preferred to leave his estate to someone who had been a very good friend and help to him. The letter was to be produced if a claim was made under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 (the Act) or otherwise. On D’s death his estate included amongst other things a half interest in Wallands Farm (the farm). The other half was owned by the estate of his late sister. An auction of the entire interest in the farm was scheduled to take place on 6 November 2014 together with other land belonging to D’s estate.
D’s children, the respondents, became aware of the contents of his will shortly after his death and they instructed solicitors to act for them in January 2014. However, they did not see the letter of wishes until May 2014 and said it was untrue, alleging that they and their mother had suffered abuse at D’s hands. On 14 January 2014 their then solicitors wrote to B’s solicitors saying that they had advised the respondents with regard to their right to apply for reasonable financial provision under the Act. They subsequently made it clear that the respondents intended to challenge the will on the grounds that it was procured by undue influence or that D lacked mental capacity at the time of making the will and to advance claims to an interest in the properties on the basis of proprietary estoppel. The respondents changed solicitors in August 2014 and their new solicitors sent B’s solicitors a letter of claim on 14 August 2014 in which they sought an assurance that no part of the estate would be marketed for sale until the resolution of the claims, failing which they would apply to the court for an injunction. B’s solicitors replied that the respondents had known for some time that it was the intention of the estate to sell its share in the farm. No undertaking not to proceed with a sale was given. In the light of this the respondents issued a caution against the first registration of the farm. They did not inform B that they had taken this step until 26 September 2014. The effect of the caution was that in practice the farm could not be sold. Also there were further practical problems since the process to challenge the registration takes a long time and meanwhile there was no undertaking in damages or other protection for the owner of the property creating an obvious difficulty where an imminent sale of the property was proposed. B applied for an order that the Chief Registrar to HM Land Registry be directed to cancel the caution forthwith.
Held
Caution to be cancelled [37]. The question was whether the respondents had a seriously arguable case that they would succeed at trial in obtaining ownership of or a proprietary interest in the real property held in D’s estate. If they did have such a case the court should not allow the beneficiary of the notice to have the protection of the notice pending trial without considering the position of the registered proprietor and whether, and if so how, far the proprietor should be protected pending trial. Thus the court had to consider whether either or both parties would be adequately compensated by an award of damages and, if neither could be adequately compensated in that way, where the balance of convenience lay [22].
In assessing both the strength of the case for proprietary relief at trial and the other issues relevant to a decision whether to grant or refuse an injunction, the respondents’ intentions with regard to the land and their ability to give effect to those intentions were highly relevant. Points to note included: (a) D’s estate was only entitled to a half share in the farm and the owners of the other half wished to sell the land and have joined with B as executrix of D’s estate in applying to cancel the caution; (b) use of the farm would need an agreement to purchase the other half and the raising of funds to do so by the respondents; (c) they had not suggested that they had any interest in farming or living at the farm; (d) they wished to maximise the value of the farm with a view to benefiting financially from its development; (e) while the second respondent did not give evidence of her means her brothers, the two other respondents, had very limited means and did not have the resources available either to buy the other half interest or to develop the property.
The respondents’ claims under the Act could not be dismissed as not seriously arguable so far as the provision of purely financial relief was concerned but since the brothers were so very short of money there was little serious prospect of obtaining an order for the transfer of any interest in land. However, their intended claim to challenge the will had different consequences. If it succeeded B’s grant of probate would be revoked and ultimately the respondents as D’s next of kin would be entitled to D’s net estate and any assets then still comprising interests in land. While the challenge based on lack of testamentary capacity was not supported by the evidence, evidence of D’s state of mind and his apparent emotional dependence on B was clearly relevant to the claim of undue influence so that claim could not be dismissed as not seriously arguable [33].
Looking at whether an award of damages would be adequate compensation, the evidence before the court was that the respondents would be unable to compensate the estate for any loss which it might suffer as a result of the caution remaining in place while it appeared likely that B would be able to compensate the respondents for any loss resulting from the cancellation of the caution [34-36].
JUDGMENT DAVID RICHARDS J: [1] The principal relief sought on this application is an order that the Chief Registrar to HM Land Registry be directed forthwith to cancel a caution entered against first registration of a farm property in Derbyshire. On 31 October I informed the parties that I had decided to make the order, …Continue reading "Williams v Seals & ors [2014] EWHC 3708 (Ch)"