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Last updateTue, 24 Feb 2015 5pm

Farrar’s Building

Farrar’s Building

Nigel Spencer Ley reviews the effect of the new discount rate on accommodation cases like Roberts v Johnstone

Amid apocalyptic warnings from insurers as to the impact of the change in the discount rate, there is one small piece of good news for defendants: if the method for calculating damages for the additional capital cost of new accommodation set out in Roberts v Johnstone [1989] is applied strictly, a claimant purchasing more expensive accommodation as a result of their disability will have to pay damages to the defendant.

Clive Thomas explains how success fees and ATE premiums are calculated

There was a time in the not too distant past when the approval of a claim for personal injuries on the part of a child was a relatively straight-forward application. The role of the court was largely restricted to ensuring that the terms of settlement were appropriate having regard to the child’s injuries. While historically a litigation friend was entitled to recover those costs that he/she had incurred on behalf of the child in pursuing the claim, few such claims were advanced. Traditionally claimant solicitors tended to accept by way of costs whatever they could recover from the defendant. However, things changed dramatically after the 1 April 2013 when success fees and after the event insurance premiums (ATEs) were no longer recoverable from the defendant but were, subject to some limitations, recoverable from the claimant.

The threshold for liability in negligence of a mentally or physically impaired tortfeasor has recently been clarified in the Court of Appeal decision in Terry Dunnage v (1) Randall (2) UK Insurance Limited [2015]. David Roderick reports

The case of Terry Dunnage v (1) Randall (2) UK Insurance Limited [2015] concerned the important question of whether or not a person suffering from a physical or mental incapacity will be liable in damages to an injured person. The extent of the mental instability in the case was extremely severe and it had resulted in a man’s actions becoming overwhelmingly directed by his deluded and deranged mind.

Hannah Saxena examines the ability of the court to set aside qualified one-way costs shifting

Two and a half years ago fundamental dishonesty was a phrase very few practitioners would have recognised. It is now over two years since the introduction of QOCS in April 2013 with the fundamental dishonesty exception and now, since 13 April 2015, s57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (the CJCA) has come into force that also uses the phrase.

Emma Sole reports on the effects of the judgment in Woodland v Essex County Council [2013]

In handing down its decision in Woodland v Essex County Council [2013] the Supreme Court expressly extended the law on non-delegable duties. This extension of law was set against a backdrop of judicial concern and caution in the High Court and Court of Appeal.

Kloosman v Aylen has clarified the court’s approach towards the presumption against double portions. Matthew Hodson examines the case.

The first question to consider when looking at the presumption against double portions is, what is a ‘portion’? Where, by will, a parent leaves a substantial share of their estate to a child and subsequently, while still alive, makes a considerable gift to that same child, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent intended the gift to be partly or wholly in substitution for the legacy.

Hannah Saxena takes a look at the recent approach taken in cases where a pedestrian has stepped into the road at the last minute and particular analysis of the Court of Appeal’s decisions in Birch v Paulson [2012] and Rehill v Rider Holdings Ltd [2012]

It is a decade since the Court of Appeal took a firm stance against drivers in the context of collisions with pedestrians: describing vehicles as a ‘potentially dangerous weapon’ and commenting on ‘the destructive disparity’ between them and pedestrians. in Lunt v Khelifa [2002] and Eagle v Chambers [2003]. The Court of Appeal stressed that it would be rare that a pedestrian would be found more to blame than a driver.